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“New China, Great Olympics”: A Historical
Study of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
as a Spectacle that Promoted Chinese
National Strength on an International
Stage
Thomas F. Garrity
Abstract

The Chinese treated the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games as a spectacle that reestablished China’s strength on
the international stage. In order to relieve the historical shame of the Century of Humiliation from Chinese
historical memory, the Chinese felt the need to both win and host international sporting events. To showcase
a “New China,” the Chinese modernized Beijing’s transportation infrastructure, attempted to reform the
manners of its citizens, and sought to dominate the medal count of the sporting events in order to broadcast
the image of a newly strengthened, modern nation to the international community. The political motivations
of the CCP led the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games to be utilized as a spectacle to promote the image of “New
China, Great Olympics,” and showcase Chinese national strength on an international stage.

T

he Chinese treated the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games as much more than a mere international sporting event. The official Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) commentary set the stage
for the highly anticipated 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games, stating: “Beijing will stun the world with
the most successful sporting event it has ever seen,
striving to compose the most dazzling chapter yet in
Olympic history” (as cited in Lovell, 2008, p. 767).
This prideful declaration sought to grandly debut
China as an Olympic host. The Beijing Games were
to be the spectacle that reestablished China’s strength
on the global stage. For what reasons would the Chinese seek to utilize this international platform for
such a nationalistic purpose?
The use of the Beijing Games in this manner was
grounded in two underlying causes: the shame embedded in recent Chinese history, and the CCP’s political motivations. The modern Chinese people are
burdened by the shameful historical memory of the
Century of Humiliation in which their nation was
militarily defeated by Western imperial powers in the

Opium Wars of the 1840s and by Japan in the Sino–
Japanese War of 1894-1895. This is what caused
China’s struggle for self-identification, as the Chinese
began to perceive their nation as merely one among
many in a “Social Darwinist” struggle for survival.
This led the Chinese to establish a strong connection
between the strength of their nation’s populace and
the strength of the nation on the international stage.
Thus, the 2008 Beijing Olympics were to be the
spectacle that proved to the global community that
China was no longer the “Sick Man of East Asia.”
The desire to prove Chinese strength on the international stage also aligned with the political motivations
of the CCP. Once Deng Xiaoping rose to preeminent
leadership of the CCP in the late 1970s, he drastically shifted the party’s focus away from communist
doctrines to more pragmatist policies. Thus, the authoritarian party’s legitimacy to rule could no longer
rely upon Maoist ideology and was instead tied to a
variety of factors, most importantly, popular nationalism. One means by which to generate this popular nationalism was through success in international
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sport. Thus, the CCP sought to utilize the Beijing
Olympic Games as a spectacle to showcase China’s
national strength in order to satisfy its political goal
of generating popular nationalism for its own legitimacy. The desire to use the Games to promote national strength is best demonstrated by the official
slogan of “New China, Great Olympics,” which was
indicative of China’s desire to showcase its recently
regained national strength and its ability to successfully host a grand international event. To showcase
a “New China,” the Chinese modernized Beijing’s
transportation infrastructure, attempted to reform
the manners of its citizens, and sought to dominate
the medal count of the sporting events in order to
broadcast the image of a newly strengthened, modern
nation. Furthermore, to host a “Great Olympics” and
showcase China’s strength, the Chinese people and
CCP placed great emphasis on the spectacular sports
venues erected for the event, such as National Stadium, as well as the opening ceremony. Ultimately,
I will argue that both the Chinese historical memory
of the Century of Humiliation and the political motivations of the CCP led the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games to be utilized as a spectacle to promote the image of “New China, Great Olympics,” and showcase
Chinese national strength on an international stage.
One day after the extravagant opening ceremonies of
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, a euphoric statement was contained within a front-page article of
a popular Chinese newspaper: “Tonight, we finally
realized the hundred-year dream of [hosting] the
Olympics” (as cited in Hung, 2011, p. 360). Why
did the Chinese hold this hundred-year dream to
host the Olympics? The answer to this query largely resides within the Chinese historical memory of
the Century of Humiliation (Brownell, 2008, p. 15;
deLisle, 2008, p. 26; Law, 2010, p. 349; Lau, Lam,
& Leung, 2010, p. 164; Xiaobo, 2008, p. 266). The
Century of Humiliation began with China’s military
defeat by Western imperial powers in the First Opium War of the early 1840s, which forced China to
sacrifice the sovereignty of its previously guarded national borders (Askew, 2009, p. 104; Huiling, 2011,
p. 168; Lau et al., 2010, pp. 162-164; Law, 2010,
p. 349; Lovell, 2008, p. 762; Parker, 2008, p. 277,
Xu, 2008, p. 17). In addition to this loss, the Chinese then suffered another devastating military defeat at the hands of invading Japanese forces in the
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1894-1895 Sino–Japanese War, cementing China’s
inability to guard its national borders (Law, 2010, p.
349; Lovell, 2008, p. 162; Parker, 2008, p. 277; Xu,
2008, p. 17). This was a crucial moment in Chinese
history, for these military defeats shattered the Sinocentric belief that China was the central power of the
civilized world (Lovell, 2008, p. 762; Xu, 2008, p.
17). Rather, the Chinese were forced to realize that
their nation was only one amongst many fighting for
survival in a Western-dominated international community (Brownell, 2008, pp. 33-34; Lovell, 2008, p.
763; Xu, 2008). This belief is largely indicative of the
Western concept of “Social Darwinism,” developed
by Thomas Henry Huxley in the 1860s, in which nations are likened to organisms that compete for resources and survival (Brownell, 2008, pp. 33-35).
The adoption of Social Darwinist thinking in China
can be largely traced to the Chinese intellectual Yan
Fu, who translated many Western works into Chinese including Huxley’s Education and Ethics for an
Eastern audience (Brownell, 2008, p. 55; Xu, 2008,
p. 17). In 1895, Yan published a Chinese article entitled “On the origins of national strength” in which
he applied the concept of Social Darwinism he encountered to the current state of the Chinese nation, which was near defeat in the Sino–Japanese war
(Xu, 2008, p. 18). In this article, Yan noted that “a
nation is like human. If an individual is not active
physically, the body will be weak. If a person is active physically, the body will be strong” (as cited in
Xu, 2008, p. 18). This statement clearly draws upon
Huxley’s ideas, namely that nations are like organisms, yet further establishes a direct link between the
physical activity level of a nation’s populace and a nation’s overall strength. However, Yan then posed the
following question: “does today’s China look like a
sick man?” (as cited in Xu, 2008, p. 18). Yan argued
that China did appear as a “sick man,” for its recent
military woes and physical subordination to the West
and Japan were signs of weakness within the international community (Xu, 2008, p. 18). Thus, it is clear
overall that Yan’s article established a direct link between the physical health of a nation’s populace and a
nation’s strength as well as applied this concept to the
Chinese national condition to determine that China
was a “sick man.”
However, this negative portrayal of China’s national
strength was not limited to domestic thought, as it
2
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was noted in an 1896 British journal article that China was the “Sick Man of East Asia” (Brownell, 2008,
pp. 34-35; Xu, 2008, p. 19). The elites of Chinese
society, ashamed at this “Sick Man” label, sought to
remove this negative designation from the minds and
headlines of both the Chinese and Western peoples
(Askew, 2009, p. 108; Huiling, 2011, p. 121; Xiaobo, 2008, pp. 266-267). One of the most advocated
methods to accomplish this goal was the adoption
of Western sport because the elite class—who largely agreed with Yan Fu’s connection between populace physical health and national strength—felt that
Western sport could strengthen the national populace’s physical condition and consequently increase
China’s national strength (Bridges, 2008, p. 245;
Brownell, 2008, p. 49; Xu, 2008, pp. 19, 28, 61). For
instance, one scholar noted that “encouraging physical training among the Chinese is essential to saving
the nation” (as cited in Xu, 2008, p. 61). Another
scholar stated, “the purpose for our advocating physical education and western sport focuses on removing
national shame and supporting national survival and
renewal” (as cited in Xu, 2008, p. 61). Yet, the best
means to demonstrate China’s physical strength and
remove the label of the “Sick Man of East Asia” was
through winning and hosting international sports
competitions, goals that the Chinese thus ached to
achieve (Askew, 2009, pp. 107-109; Brownell, 2008,
p. 19; Law, 2010, p. 350). The desire of the Chinese
to both win and host international sporting events to
showcase their national strength is best demonstrated
by the three “Olympic Dreams” questions (Brownell,
2008, p. 19). Posed by Chinese patriots in the Chinese YMCA program in 1907, these questions were:
When will China be able to send a winning athlete to the Olympic contests,
when will China be able to send a winning team to the Olympic contests, and
when will China be able to invite all the
world to Beijing for an International
Olympic contest? (Brownell, 2008, p.
19)
These questions distinctly demonstrate that winning
and hosting the Olympics have long been Chinese
nationalistic goals to prove that they were strong
(Askew, 2009, p. 104; Brownell, 2009, p. 189; Cha,
2009, pp. 64-65, 147; Hung, 2011, pp. 367, 370;
Lau et al., 2010, pp. 168-169; Price, 2009, p. 5; Xu,
Published by KnightScholar, 2017
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2008, pp. 6, 36, 267). Therefore, it is apparent that
the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were more than
just a sporting event to the Chinese. Rather, they were
a nationalistic spectacle to prove China’s strength to
the international community and shed the label that
was preserved in Chinese historical memory.
This aspiration to achieve nationalistic strength was
also contained within the political motivations of the
CCP. The origins of these political motivations can
largely be traced to the reformative ideas of Deng Xiaoping, the foremost CCP leader of the late twentieth
century. Deng assumed preeminent party leadership
in 1979 and immediately established a new direction
for CCP rule (Brady, 2009, p. 4). Under the previous leadership of Mao Zedong, the CCP garnered its
ruling legitimacy from revolutionary communist ideologies that offered an alternative to Western capitalism (Askew, 2009, p. 106). In contrast, Deng sought
to recast the CCP as a “party in power” rather than
as a “revolutionary party” (Askew, 2009, p. 106). As
part of this recasting, Deng orchestrated a shift in the
CCP’s economic ideology from communism to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Askew, 2009,
p. 106), which involved a series of market reform
and opening-up policies. Due to these market liberalizing policies, the CCP could no longer rely upon
revolutionary communist ideology to establish legitimacy and thus sought to fill this ideological vacuum
through a variety of alternative principles (Brownell,
2008, pp. 63-64; Haugen, 2008, p. 146; Xu, 2008,
pp. 198, 202). Of these alternative principles, one
of the most imperative was an increased sense of
Chinese popular nationalism (Askew, 2009, p. 106;
Brady, 2009, p. 3; Brownell, 2009, pp. 63-64; Haugen, 2008, p. 146).
One of the most visible ways in which the CCP attempted to generate this popular nationalism was
through success in international sport, since this
would create an image of a strong China and subsequently increase CCP legitimacy (Brady, 2009, p.
3; Law, 2010, p. 353; Jarvie, Hwang, & Brennan,
2008, p. 99; Xiaobo, 2008, p. 267). Efforts to utilize
international sport and the Olympic Games in this
manner began as early as 1979, when the Chinese
National Sports Commission developed an “Olympic Model” for winning certain events at the 1980
Olympic Games (Xu, 2008, p. 197). The CCP’s use
of international sport to showcase China’s strength
3
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was once again demonstrated at the 1984 Olympic
Games, at which CCP representatives openly linked
success in sports competitions with national honor
and prestige (Xu, 2008, p. 202). Furthermore, the
15 gold medals won by Chinese athletes at the 1984
Olympics—the first such medals in Chinese history—were portrayed by the CCP as “just the beginning” for the Chinese who sought to prove their
nation’s strength (Brady, 2009, p. 3; deLisle, 2008,
p. 25; Jarvie et al., 2008, p. 99; Xiaobo, 2008, p.
264; Xu, 2008, p. 203). Finally, scholars have readily
noted that no other country or government has been
as eager to increase its international prestige through
international sporting events as China and the CCP
(Askew, 2009, pp. 109, 114; Brady, 2009, pp. 5,7;
Dong-Jhy, Barnier, Heitzman, & Wei-Cheng, 2011,
p. 119; Hung, 2011; Tong, 2008, pp. 249-250; Xiaobo, 2008, p. 265; Xu, 2008, p. 203). Therefore,
it is once again clear that the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games were more than merely a sporting event.
Rather, the CCP utilized the Games as a spectacle to
showcase Chinese national strength in order to generate popular nationalism for its own legitimacy.
The clearest and most succinct manifestation of
these nationalistic intentions is contained within the
official, international slogan of the Beijing Games:
“New China, Great Olympics” (Law, 2010, p. 350;
Xu, 2008, p. 243). The “New China” represented in
this slogan was a revitalized nation, whose populace
sought to portray their selection as host of the 2008
Olympics as a sign that China had recovered from
the Century of Humiliation (Law, 2010, p. 350; Xu,
2008, p. 243). Furthermore, the Chinese wanted to
utilize their position as host to symbolically reestablish China’s national strength in the international
community and prove to Olympic visitors that China
could compete with the western powers (Law, 2010,
p. 350; Xu, 2008, p. 243). In the attempt to grandly
showcase the “New China’s” regained strength to the
visiting athletes and spectators of the Beijing Games,
the Chinese instituted a series of reforms between
the 2001 announcement and the 2008 Games. One
such reform was the modernization of Beijing’s uninspiring transportation infrastructure (Cha, 2009,
pp. 111-113; Bridges, 2011, p. 246; Hung, 2011, p.
360; Jinxia, 2011, p. 169). It is estimated that the
Chinese spent 40 billion U.S. dollars on this reform
effort, the most ever spent on infrastructure develop-

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2016/iss1/13

ments for an Olympic event (Cha, 2009, pp. 111113; Bridges, 2011, p. 246; Hung, 2011, p. 360;
Jinxia, 2011, p. 169). While this budget was widely
distributed on a number of projects, including the
creation of new expressways and four new subway
lines, one of the most expensive aspects of this effort
was the construction of Terminal 3 at Beijing International Airport (Cha, 2009, p. 111). At the time it
was built, Terminal 3 was the largest airport terminal
in the world and it was meant to demonstrate China’s
strength to Olympic visitors immediately upon their
entry to the “New China” (Cha, 2009, pp. 111-112).
Thus, the modernization of Beijing’s infrastructure
was clearly a manifestation of the desire to showcase
China’s national strength to Olympic visitors.
Another reform movement undertaken between
2001 and 2008 was a campaign aimed toward improving the manners of Chinese citizens (Brady,
2009, pp.17-18; Cha, 2009, p. 70; deLisle, 2008, pp.
24-25; Law, 2010, pp.351-352; Xu, 2008, pp 251252). This campaign sought to reform a number of
civilian habits that the Chinese feared would be negatively viewed by Olympic tourists, such as cutting
in line, spitting in public and littering (Brady, 2009,
pp.17-18; Cha, 2009, p. 70; deLisle, 2008, pp. 2425; Law, 2010, pp. 351-352; Xu, 2008, pp 251-252).
The good host campaign was instituted directly by
the Communist Party-state apparatus as evidenced
by the inclusion of high-ranking members of the
Communist Party on the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG). Overall,
BOCOG had 650 Communist Party members who
led the good host campaign from a top-down perspective. The programs themselves were instituted
through targeted school programs and the distribution of Olympic readers that espoused the manners
that the Chinese government wanted their citizens to
demonstrate (Law, 2010, pp. 343-367). Ultimately,
this campaign was clearly an attempt to showcase
the strength of the “New China” to Olympic visitors
through the projection of a strong, civilized national
populace (Cha, 2009, p. 71).
China properly demonstrated this through not only
reforming their infrastructure and manners, but also
improve their performance in the Olympic sporting
events themselves. The desire to utilize the Olympic sporting events as a platform to demonstrate
China’s strength was directly related to the shame
4
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of the Century of Humiliation and the ideas of Yan
Fu, as the modern Chinese still linked the physical
ability of a nation’s populace with national strength
(Hung, 2011, p. 360; Law, 2010, p. 350; Xu, 2008,
p. 267). This link was clearly reestablished in an article of the The People’s Daily that was published following the 2004 Athens Olympics (Lovell, 2008,
pp. 773). This article noted that “when a country is
powerful, its sports will flourish… Chinese athletes
will make contributions to realize our nation’s great
revival” (as cited in Lovell, 2008, pp. 773). Thus,
in order to strengthen the performance of Chinese
athletes and consequently showcase a strong nation,
the “Plan to Win Glory in the 2008 Olympics” was
implemented in 2002 (Lau et al., 2011, p. 163). This
plan identified 119 gold medals that the Chinese
sought to win in events such as swimming and gymnastics, increased the budget for these athletics teams
and created a new nutrition plan for these athletes
that would allot them a higher calorie intake (Brady,
2009, p. 7; Lau et al., 2011, p. 163). Although Chinese athletes did not win all 119 medals identified in
this plan, China still topped the medal count with 51
gold medals, 15 more than the second-place finisher
(Brady, 2009, p. 7; Huiling, 2011, pp. 102, 275; Xu,
2008, p. 268). These athletic victories were seen as
a great source of Chinese national pride, as it showcased to the world that China no longer deserved the
“Sick Man of East Asia” label (Askew, 2008, p. 110;
Brady, 2009, p. 7; Cha, 2009, pp. 3, 66; Xu, 2008,
p. 257). Therefore, the athletic accomplishments of
Chinese Olympians can ultimately be seen as another
attempt to demonstrate the “New China’s” strength
to the world, since athletic success was promoted in
order to project the image of a strong China to the
international community. Overall, it is clear that the
modernization of Beijing’s infrastructure, the reform
of the populace’s manners and the success of Chinese
athletes were all Chinese attempts to showcase the
“New China’s” national strength on the international
stage of the Olympics.
However, the Chinese did not only wish to showcase their national strength through their modern
infrastructure, polite populace and accomplished
athletes. Rather, they further desired to showcase
their national strength through their ability to host a
“Great Olympics” (Law, 2010, p. 350; Xu, 2008, p.
243). The ability to smoothly host countries from all
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over the world at the preeminent international sporting event was seen as a great source of nationalistic
pride for the Chinese, as it was an enormous event
that required meticulous planning and coordination
(Cha, 2009, pp. 36, 61; deLisle, 2008, p. 32; Lau
et al., 2011, p. 169; Lovell, 2008, p. 767). Yet, the
Chinese further sought to utilize their position as
host to showcase their national strength by providing
the “most dazzling chapter yet in Olympic history”
(Lovell, 2008, p. 767). To host this “Great Olympics” and demonstrate China’s strength, the Chinese
emphasized the creation of spectacular sports venues and a grand performance at the Games opening
ceremony (Lovell, 2008, p. 767). The most notable
sports venue and iconic symbol of the 2008 Beijing
Games was National Stadium, which is more commonly referred to as the Bird’s Nest due to its weaved
steel frame that encloses the inner-arena (Cha, 2009,
p. 112; Hung, 2011, p. 360). This unorthodox design
was the creation of Swiss architect Jacques Herzog,
who noted that “you couldn’t do such an avant-garde
structure anywhere else, but the Chinese are so fresh
in mind…everyone is encouraged to do their most
stupid and extravagant designs there. National Stadium tells me nothing will shake them” (Xu, 2008,
p. 254). This statement clearly indicates that the daring to attempt such a complex design project and the
ability to successfully complete its construction were
meant to be a sign of Chinese strength in the international community. Therefore, the spectacular venues
of the 2008 Olympics were clearly a method for China host a “Great Olympics” and thereby showcase its
national strength to the world.
The extravagant opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was another method by which
the Chinese sought to demonstrate their strength
and ability to host the international community. The
opening ceremony is a crucial event for all Olympic
hosts, since it allows nations to fashion a narrative of
their country that is broadcasted internationally to
large audiences (Barmé, 2009, p. 67; Brownell, 2008,
p. 165; Kennett & de Moragas, 2008, p. 262). Due
to its ability to craft and project a narrative, including one of national strength, the opening ceremony
was assigned a high-level of importance by the CCP
(Barmé, 2009, p. 64; Brady, 2009, pp. 19-20; Hung,
2011, p. 360). The CCP’s emphasis on the opening
ceremony is clearly demonstrated by its strict guide-

5

58

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2016 [2017], Art. 13

lines for the event, which stated that the ceremony
should be “outstanding, innovative…[reflecting] the
strong spirit of the age” (Barmé, 2009, p. 70). Furthermore, the CCP hoped to “take an international
perspective,” as well as highlight the “brilliant civilization” of the Qing era and the “glorious era” of the
modern day (Barmé, 2009, p. 70). Thus, the principal goal of the organizers and choreographers of the
opening ceremony was to grandly and spectacularly
showcase China’s historical journey as a strong nation, highlighting China’s traditional and renewed
strength, while notably omitting signs of weakness
like the Century of Humiliation (Barmé, 2009, p.
68; Hung, 2011, p. 363). Within themselves, these
guidelines for the opening ceremony clearly demonstrate that the ceremony was a method for China
to host a “Great Olympics” as well as showcase its
strength to the international community.
Yet, the Chinese did not only seek to demonstrate
national strength and host a “Great Olympics”
through the narrative of the opening ceremony, but
also through the organized and disciplined nature of
the actors as well. This is most clearly demonstrated
in the initial act of the event that opened with 2,008
stylized drummers playing traditional fou drums in
near-perfect unison, demonstrating an outstanding
ability to organize a grand event (Barmé, 2009, p.
71; Hung, 2011, p. 366). Furthermore, over 14,000
actors participated in the opening ceremony that
was executed flawlessly, once again demonstrating
the ability of the Chinese to carefully coordinate this
spectacular event (Brady, 2009, p. 19; Hung, 2011,
pp. 364, 367). Therefore, it is clear that the CCP
sought to utilize the narrative and coordination of
the Beijing Games’ opening ceremony as another opportunity to host a “Great Olympics” and thereby
demonstrate China’s strength and ability to host the
international community. Overall, both the spectacular venues and the opening ceremony of the 2008
Beijing Olympic Games were clearly meant to showcase China’s national strength through its ability to
host a “Great Olympics.”
In conclusion, it is clear that the Chinese treated the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games as more than a mere
international sporting event, as they were utilized as a
spectacle to reestablish China’s strength on the international stage. The use of the Beijing Games in this
manner was largely grounded in both Chinese hishttps://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2016/iss1/13

torical memory and CCP political motivations. The
shattered Sino-centric worldview led the Chinese to
realize that their nation was only one amongst many
fighting for survival. This Eastern application of Social Darwinism was strongly advocated by the Chinese intellectual Yan Fu created a direct connection
for the Chinese between a physically strong populace
and a strong nation, leading many Chinese elites to
advocate the adoption of Western sport to prove that
their country was no longer the “Sick Man of East
Asia.” To prove this to themselves and the rest of the
world, the Chinese long sought to both win and host
international sporting events. Consequently, it is
clear that the Chinese truly utilized the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games as a spectacle to showcase China’s
national strength in order to prove that it is no longer
the “Sick Man of East Asia.”
Furthermore, the desire to showcase China’s national strength on the international stage of the 2008
Olympics was also contained within the political motivations of the CCP. Due to Deng Xiaoping’s shift of
party ideology, the CCP could no longer rely upon
Maoist doctrines for its ruling legitimacy. Instead,
the CCP sought to establish its legitimacy through
a variety of factors, including an increased sense of
popular nationalism. One of the most important
means by which this nationalism could be generated
was through strong Chinese performances in international sport. These strong performances would portray the image of a strong China to the international
community and subsequently increase popular nationalism and CCP legitimacy. Therefore, it is clear
that the CCP also sought to utilize the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games as a spectacle to promote China’s
national strength in order to satisfy its own political goal of generating popular nationalism. These
two nationalistic desires to promote China’s regained
strength on the international stage were most clearly manifested in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
through the official slogan of “New China, Great
Olympics.” To showcase a “New China” to Olympic visitors, the Chinese modernized Beijing’s transportation infrastructure, promoted mass campaigns
to reform the manners of its citizens, and sought to
dominate on the sports field to top the medal count.
Similarly, to host a “Great Olympics” and thus further demonstrate China’s national strength to the international community, the Chinese people and the
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CCP placed great emphasis on the spectacular sports
venues erected for the event, such as the Bird’s Nest
Stadium, and the opening ceremony, which was centered on a narrative of national strength. Ultimately,
it is clearly proven that both the Chinese historical
memory of the Century of Humiliation and the political motivations of the CCP led the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games to be utilized as a spectacle to promote the image of “New China, Great Olympics,”
and showcase Chinese national strength on an international stage.
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